In May 2026, a group of German experts including Jeannette zu Fürstenberg, Moritz Schularick, Nico Lange, René Obermann and Thomas Enders published a strategic manifesto that precisely diagnoses the weaknesses of German and European defense and points to a concrete path for development. The authors emphasize that Germany and Europe are strategically dependent on the United States across the entire military value chain, from the combat cloud, through command systems, satellite reconnaissance and communications, to conventional and nuclear deterrence.
Although Europe has the second-largest defense budget in the world and a competitive industrial and technological base, the lack of production capacity prevents it from acting independently.
"The fundamental assumptions of European defense are being put to the test for two reasons. First, because the strategic center of gravity of the United States has shifted to other regions of the world. Second, leaving aside the question of burden-sharing, it is no longer possible to deny the transatlantic differences regarding the importance of the rule of law, democratic principles and international law," reads the document titled "The Path to European Defence Autonomy: A Guide to Overcoming Critical Dependencies"
In the vision presented, Germany breaks free from dependence on the United States. The authors of the manifesto indicate that the strategic focus of the United States is shifting to other regions of the world, and that transatlantic differences in the perception of the principles of law and democracy make continued reliance on NATO guarantees risky. The German experts do not, however, want to build an entirely isolationist defense strategy. Their strategy assumes close European integration within a "Team Europe" formula among a so-called "coalition of the willing" of states, encompassing both traditional partners from Western Europe and the United Kingdom as well as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. The key is to be overcoming the fragmentation that currently causes Europe to achieve 30–40 percent less combat capability per euro invested than other regions.
In parallel, Germany wants to launch mass production of autonomous drone systems, loitering munitions, and unmanned ground and naval vehicles, ultimately reaching a scale of millions of units per year. The production capacity itself is to be linked to Germany's automotive power.
The authors of the analysis emphasize the need to achieve a realistic cost structure in the area of armaments. Instead of expensive equipment, cheap, mass-produced solutions are to dominate, including lasers and microwave systems. In space, Germany is additionally striving to build European reconnaissance, communications and navigation satellites, which would reduce dependence on Starlink and GPS. This requires not only the expansion of existing programs such as IRIS or Galileo PRS, but also independent access to orbit through an increased frequency of launches. Added to this are strategic airlift, medical capabilities, and electronic warfare and SEAD/DEAD, that is, the ability to blind, jam and destroy enemy air defense systems. All of these areas are to be combined into a single coherent architecture, resistant to electromagnetic disruption and cyberattacks.
The realization of this vision has a concrete time horizon. The authors estimate that significant progress in most areas is possible within 3–5 years, and broad defense autonomy could be achieved in 5–10 years, provided the matter is given high political priority. Costs were estimated at €150–200 billion by 2030 and about €500 billion over a decade. This money represents merely one-third of the planned increase in the European defense budgets of all member states, or about 0.25 percent of the GDP of the European Union plus the United Kingdom and Norway.
Germany, however, does not limit itself to financial declarations. The document published by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) contains revolutionary proposals for changing the armaments paradigm. Instead of multi-page specifications and the purchase of off-the-shelf systems, "show before you buy" is to dominate, that is, prototype competitions. Contracts for production capacity on the scale of millions of units per year are also planned, with fees for reserve readiness. Instead of focusing on large corporations — opening the ecosystem to startups, dual-use from the automotive industry and startups. The goal of German efforts is a fast track for sovereignty projects, flexible contracts instead of rigid technical requirements, and strong incentives for rapidly scaling production and supply chains.
Although German experts are speaking ever more loudly about European strategic autonomy, reality shows that Europe still remains heavily dependent on the United States in practically all key areas of defense. This applies in particular to satellite reconnaissance, command systems, logistics, strategic transport, missile defense, nuclear deterrence and modern military technologies.
Despite the large defense expenditures of European states, Europe's military potential is today clearly smaller than that of the United States. The Americans possess global power projection, an enormous arms industry, technological dominance and operational experience built over decades. Europe, by contrast, still suffers from the fragmentation of weapons systems, bureaucracy and limited production capacity.
The economic situation of Germany and the entire European Union also remains a problem. The German economy is under pressure from high energy costs, an industrial slowdown and a competitiveness crisis. In many EU countries, debt, social tensions and the costs of the energy transition are rising. Under such conditions, building full military autonomy would require many years of gigantic investments counted in the hundreds of billions of euros.
In addition, Europe today does not have its own equivalent of the American nuclear umbrella or comparable strategic deterrence capabilities. Even France and the United Kingdom possess a potential significantly smaller than that of the United States, and some Central and Eastern European states — including Poland — still perceive the presence of American troops as a key guarantor of security against Russia.
For this reason, many analysts believe that Europe can increase its military self-reliance, but in the foreseeable future it will not be able to completely replace American military and strategic support.
What exactly do the German experts want? The authors of the manifesto call for building European military autonomy — from the production of armaments and drones to satellite systems, communications and logistics — so that Europe can act independently of the United States.
Does this mean a weakening of NATO? Formally no, because the authors declare continued cooperation within the Alliance. In practice, however, the document assumes a reduction of Europe's strategic dependence on the United States, which could lead to tensions within NATO.
Why is the topic important for Poland? For years Poland has based its security mainly on its alliance with the United States and the presence of U.S. troops in the region. Strengthening the German defense project could increase pressure to build a more centralized security policy in the EU.
Do the Germans want to create a "European army"? The manifesto does not use this term explicitly, but it proposes a very far-reaching integration of the arms industry, command systems and military production of European states.
How quickly could such a project be realized? According to the authors, the first effects could appear within 3–5 years, and a fuller strategic autonomy for Europe would be achieved within a horizon of about a decade.
